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Abstract 
The deregulation of healthcare financing and supply in Nigeria has shifted the 
healthcare system towards competitive market ideals. Households’ decision to utilize 
healthcare is identical with healthcare financing. This financing arrangement has potentials 
for income redistribution in a society with already high levels of inequality in resource 
redistribution. This study attempts to examine the extent to which this system of healthcare 
financing leads to catastrophic expenditures, defined as a threshold percentage of a 
household’s income, and the extent of impoverishment arising from healthcare spending. It 
also uses the Aronson, Johnson, and Lambert (1994) decomposition framework to analyze 
redistributive effects in terms of vertical and horizontal inequities, as well as re-ranking effect. 
The study finds that healthcare spending engenders high incidence of catastrophic spending 
and impoverishment in the population. It also finds that healthcare spending is pro-rich in its 
redistributive effect, with significant vertical and horizontal inequities as well as reranking 
inherent in the system. The paper suggests policy reforms that separate healthcare utilization 
from healthcare financing if the poor are to have access to healthcare services. 
Key words:  redistributive effects, healthcare financing, catastrophic financing, 
impoverishing effects, equity, Nigeria 
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1. Introduction 
Since the mid-1980s, economic and social development policies in Nigeria have been 
marked by structural shifts from state-dominated to market-driven paradigms. While these 
shifts are considered necessary for improved economic performance, they have, 
nevertheless, heightened the prevailing elitist orientation in the country’s political economy: in 
which privilege and socioeconomic advantages have joined to create large inequalities 
between the affluent and powerful few, and the poor and powerless majority. In the provision 
of social services, this orientation, a carry-over from the colonial times, represents a 
complete dissonance between constitutional guarantees of rights to basic social services and 
the dominance of socioeconomic advantages as the most important parameter for access to 
these same services (Eze 1991; Alubo 1987). The end result is that the majority of people 
are excluded from these services, or obtain them at great opportunity costs.  
This study focuses on the effects of these policy shifts in the health sector. In 
particular, it analyzes how the policy of direct financing of healthcare based on ability to pay 
(ATP) that characterizes both the public and private supply of healthcare services affects the 
relative post-payment abilities of households to meet other basic needs such as household 
consumption. The study essentially aims to analyze the redistributive impact of direct 
healthcare financing by Nigerian households using survey sample data generated in Enugu 
state in 2004.  
Initially, we consider the extent of catastrophic financing and impoverishing effects 
arising out of direct healthcare financing. Secondly, we consider the redistributive effects in 
terms of vertical and horizontal equities and re-ranking effects
1. The vertical equity effect is 
defined to be the extent the healthcare system is sensitive to the differences in income of 
healthcare consumers: Does the health system treat the population unequally in the sense 
that people contribute to the healthcare system according to their level of ability to pay? 
Horizontal equity is simply defined as equal treatment of equals (Musgrave, 1990): that is, do 
people with equal income contribute equal amounts to the healthcare system? Finally, re-
ranking refers to rank-switching among the various members of the population induced by 
differences in contribution to the healthcare system. The underlying assumption is that equity 
in healthcare financing demands that the rich and healthy should subsidize the poor and the 
                                                 
1 The highly technical aspects of the full report submitted to PEP have been significantly toned down in 
this abridged version. For example, the consideration of the Duclos et al (2003) decomposition 
framework has been removed from this version because of its very technical nature. For further 
reference, the reader is urged to consult the full text of the report.    3
sick. Contributions to healthcare financing must be according to ability and utilization must be 
according to need.  
2  Healthcare financing in Nigeria 
Since the bubble burst on the country’s oil industry in the 1980s, there has been a 
significant drop in the budgetary provision for health services in Nigeria. Budgetary 
provisions for healthcare services hardly exceeded 3 percent of total budgetary outlay. 
Health spending averaged a mere 1.9 percent of total federal government expenditure in the 
1980s (Orubuloye and Oni, 1996, Ogunbekun 1991). The share of public health spending 
improved to only 2.55 percent in 1996, 1.96 percent in 1997, 2.99 percent in 1998, 1.95 in 
1999 and 2.5 percent in 2000 (Central Bank of Nigeria 2001). Most of what was budgeted 
was used to meet personnel costs (Nwosu 2000). Government healthcare funding was less 
than 0.2. percent of GDP (UNDP, 2000) as against the 1 percent benchmark set by the 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (Sachs et al 2001) and 15 percent of annual 
national budget  stipulated in the Abuja 2001 Declaration on roll-back malaria program 
(Please explain briefly how this Declaration is an important reference point for government 
spending for healthcare). This amounts to only a $2 (US dollars?) healthcare subsidy per 
capita whereas the ideal healthcare expenditure per capita is $15 (World Bank 1994). In 
other words, government is responsible for only about 13 percent of the entire healthcare 
expenditure in the economy. The WHO benchmark for public health spending in Low Income 
Countries is $34 per capita (WHO, 2002). This implies that households have almost sole 
responsibility for financing their health costs.  
The poor provision and delivery of public health services and the attendant user 
charge for almost every item of treatment in the public health system has encouraged the 
explosion of private medical practice in Nigeria. In some states, private provision of health 
facilities constitutes over 75 percent of total health facilities in the state (Ichoku, 2005; Akwa 
Ibom State, 1999). Private medicine covers a wide range of providers ranging from drug 
vendors, pharmacy shops and sellers of traditional medicine servicing maternity homes, 
health clinics, and private tertiary hospitals. Most of these are located in urban areas 
(Ogunbekun et al, 1999) and provide basically curative services (Alubo 2001). Healthcare is 
paid for on a cash and carry basis. Ogunbekun et al (1999) report that 85 percent of the 
respondents in their survey sample reported paying for healthcare directly out-of-pocket. The 
Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH) (2003) estimates that over 70 percent of healthcare 
payments in Nigeria are made out-of-pocket.  
Due to the high level of competition and overriding profit motive in the supply of 
healthcare, there are all forms of unethical behavior in the market. In most cases, patients   4
are required to deposit money before treatment commences, and it is stopped once the 
deposit is exhausted (Alubo 2001). Competition in healthcare supplies has also resulted in 
the increased importation and distribution of fake and adulterated drugs, which in turn have 
led to widespread incidences of treatment failure, drug poisoning, and death (Alubo, 1994)  
There is the virtual absence of third-party intermediaries in healthcare financing: 
Ogunbekun (1996) estimates that only about 0.03 percent of the population are covered by 
private healthcare insurance. Other forms of third-party intervention are hardly in existence. 
Thus, households have to bear the cost of medical treatment. Healthcare is supplied at 
competitive market prices. However, in the presence of information asymmetries that 
characterize the medical markets, these competitive market prices are often higher than what 
could be obtained in ordinary commodity markets. Not only are costs of allocative 
inefficiencies that prevail in the healthcare system passed on to the consumer, s/he is not 
also informed of the types and qualities of drugs prescribed for her/him. To make matters 
worse, there are price cartels operating in the health system whereby healthcare providers in 
a given locality or type of practice stipulate the charges for each type of treatment. In effect, 
members of the union are penalized for charging less (Ogunbekun et al, 1999, Alubo 2001).  
All these sum up to the fact that the cost of healthcare in Nigeria is high and impose 
significant and uneven burdens on households. As Alubo (1987:1) summarizes it, “In 
practice, status, power and privileges determine whether or not one gets western medical 
services and of what type in contemporary Nigeria. Only a few rich people can afford 
adequate health services. Alubo (1987:453) puts it succinctly thus: “… medical services for 
the generality (sic) of the people have remained a second rate priority of post-colonial 
governments, very much like the situation in colonial days. The care for state employees and 
other elites continues to take precedence.”  
3  Research method and data 
In order to address the different policy concerns raised in this paper namely, the 
incidence and intensity of catastrophic healthcare financing, its impoverishing effects, and 
equity concerns, we adopt different analytical techniques. These techniques are developed in 
the context of the specific issues discussed below. The data for this analysis was generated 
in 2004 and were part of a larger study aimed at analyzing inequalities in health distribution 
and the impact of direct healthcare financing on households in Enugu state, Nigeria.  
A number of factors guided the process that generated the data. The overriding need 
for high quality data that was representative of the population was the main driver in planning 
and executing the fieldwork survey. This is because for an empirical econometric study to   5
achieve its purpose, it is clearly important that the underlying data-generating process has to 
be captured as accurately as possible in the sample data.  
Since the cost of resources required to generate a nationally representative data 
would be rather prohibitive, the survey had to focus on a geographic location; in this case, 
Enugu state. One of Nigeria’s thirty six states, Enugu had a population of 3 million in 2002. It 
is located in the Southeast and mirrors all the development features of Nigeria: it has a dual 
economy with both metropolitan industrial and rural agrarian economy. The choice of Enugu 
state as the study site was not random, as it was based on the researcher’s prior information 
about the state’s population. Such prior information often enhances the accuracy of the data 
and the econometric estimates since it can assist the researcher in designing an effective 
method to strengthen the efficiency of the statistical inference about the population under 
study (Deaton 1997).  
Enugu is located in Southeastern Nigeria (approximately between latitude  5′ 5 5
0  and 
8′ 0 7
0 north of the equator and  5′ 5 6
0  and  8′ 0 7
0 east of the Greenwich Meridian), with a 
population density of about 273 persons per square kilometer. Enugu state is made up of 17 
local government areas (LGAs). It has three sub-ethnic groups:– Udi, Nkanu and Nsukka, 
corresponding to the state’s three senatorial districts. Its metropolitan city and administrative 
capital is Enugu (the coal city), which incidentally used to be the administrative capital of the 
whole southeastern region of Nigeria, comprising nine states in the present 36-state political 
structure. Enugu state also has a number of semi-urban centers as well as numerous rural 
village communities. Majority of the urban dwellers are civil servants, coal mine workers, 
traders, transporters and artisans. On the other hand, most of the rural dwellers are 
subsistence farmers and petty traders.  
The method adopted for the survey is a multistage-sampling design, where the state 
was first stratified according to urban and rural locations. Within each of these strata, clusters 
of households are selected using the pre-existing clustering arrangements used by the 
Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) and the National Population Commission for Censuses. 
The clusters were used as Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), and altogether there were about 
3,000 PSUs in Enugu. A hundred of these were selected at random in proportion to the size 
of each stratum.  
The FOS provided the household frame for the sampling. Each PSU was made up of 
approximately 20 households. Fifteen (15) households were selected at random from each 
PSU giving a total of 1,500 households with about 5,814 individuals. During the data 
screening and massaging however, three households were dropped from the list for 
inconsistent information, leaving a total of 1,497 on the final list.   6
4  Patterns of healthcare expenditure 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the gross and health expenditures in Enugu state 
according to income quintiles. We assume for now that there are no intra-household 
inequalities in resource distribution, and that furthermore, there are no economies of scale. In 
other words, we assume that both the gross and health care expenditures are made on a per 
capita basis. These assumptions would be relaxed in subsequent sections.  
Table 1: Distribution of Per Capita Gross and Health Expenditures by Quintiles 
Quintile    No. obs  Mean Inc  SD  Min  Max 
1 Gross  exp  300 741.75 233.86 133.87 1137.5
 H.Exp  300 52.89 91.51 0  700.29
2 Gross  exp  299 1547.88 240.73 1138.91  1980.39
 H.exp  299 104.70 215.10 0  1715.17
3 Gross  exp  300 2496.01 323.40 1988.28  3071.96
 H.Exp  300 152.01 320.09 0  1798.42
4 Gross  exp  299 3861.11 483.76 3081.03  4820.00
 H.  exp  299 210.24 505.35 0  2811.00
5 Gross  exp  299 9299.82 6432.82 4852.67  60516.10
 H.  Exp  299 1065.43 2882.82 0  30371.00
Source: H.E. Ichoku, 2006 
The mean income in the first quintile is about N741
2  and the mean healthcare 
expenditure is N53. In the 5
th quintile, the mean gross expenditure is N9300 while mean 
health expenditure is N1065. The ratio of mean healthcare expenditure of the 5
th quintile to 
the health expenditure of the 1
st quintile is 1:20. However, in terms of relative expenditure 
(i.e., healthcare expenditure as a percentage of gross expenditure) we find that the higher 
income quintiles bear greater healthcare financing burden. For example, in the first quintile, 
healthcare takes only about 7.2 percent of total expenditure. But in the 5
th quintile, healthcare 
takes about 11.5 percent of total expenditure.  
Figure 2: Distribution of Healthcare Financing by Income Groups 









 HC Exp Gross Exp
 
Source: H.E. Ichoku, 2006 
                                                 
2 At the time of the survey the exchange rate was US$1 = N130.   7
We argue that there is a lot of suppressed medical need among the poor. This is 
because even in developed countries with less epidemiological burdens, healthcare 
expenditure per capita is about 13 percent of per capita income, although about 90 percent 
of this is provided by the public (people?) (Gerdtham et al 1996). Secondly, the poor 
patronize the cheapest means of treatment, usually self-medication and street drug vendors, 
and are unable to afford proper medical treatment (Ichoku and Leibbrandt 2003). Thus, in 
view of the fact that almost all household expenditures are paid out-of-pocket, it seems that 
11 percent of total expenditure of the rich on healthcare is a better reflection of healthcare 
need while 7 percent is a reflection of the poor’s unmet healthcare needs. This would seem 
to suggest that, given the general evidence that health follows a positive gradient, under a 
self financed healthcare system, the majority of low income earners would either 1) tend to 
avoid using health facilities on account; or 2) under-spend in healthcare probably because 
they have to trade-off healthcare expenditures with other basic needs like food, shelter and 
schooling.  
Figure 3 plots the expected and conditional standard deviation of healthcare 
expenditures. The expected values were generated by running a non-parametric kernel 
regression of gross expenditure on payments using the distributive analysis software DAD. 
As can readily be observed, the level of expenditures for both the expected and conditional 
deviation indicates that this level increases with an increase in the household’s standard of 
living. 
Figure 3: Expected vs. Conditional Standard Deviation of Healthcare Expenditures 
 
Source: H.E. Ichoku, 2006 
What effect does healthcare payment have on income distribution at the post-
payment period? To answer this question, a scatter- diagram of the gross income (with gross 
expenditure as proxy indicator) is plotted against the post-payment net income, as shown in 
Figure 4. This Figure shows that the distribution of post-payment net income on prepayment 
income is restricted to the lower, right hand triangle. Notice that if there were no payments   8
made, the plot of the net income against prepayment income would be a diagonal line. If 
every household contributes to the health system in exact proportion to its prepayment 
income, the diagonal line would shift downward by the exact percentage of the contribution to 
the gross income, a similar effect if it were lump-sum tax. 
Figure 4: Scatter Diagrams of Gross vs. Expected Net Expenditure 
 
Source: H.E. Ichoku, 2006 
However, none of these effects is the case here. What is seen in Figure 4 is that while 
many households that did not contribute to healthcare financing maintained their original 
positions on the diagonal, many others who made contributions did not. Thus, the scattered 
residuals represent households who fell below the diagonal; this implies that their net income 
is below their prepayment income. Such payments could indeed be catastrophic because it 
takes a large proportion of the household income and diverts it to healthcare, thus leaving 
such households with very little to spend on other basic needs. This is also a major source of 
policy concern (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2001) Please explain this point further. How is 
this a major policy concern in Nigeria? This phenomenon will be discussed in greater detail in 
subsequent sections.  
In the interim, suffice it to note that conventional analysis of equity often distinguishes 
two aspects: vertical and horizontal equity. Put simply, vertical equity is the “unequal 
treatment of unequals” while horizontal equity is the “equal treatment of equals” (Mooney 
1983:179). The latter is concerned with the fair treatment of people who are alike in every 
respect. In the case of healthcare financing, horizontal equity requires that households or 
individuals who have equal ability to pay should make (allot?) equal amounts for equal 
healthcare needs. It is important to emphasize that since ill-health is a random phenomenon, 
every member of the society ought to be equally protected or insured against the risk of 
unprovided health expenditure irrespective of one’s socioeconomic status. This implies that 
everyone with the same ability to pay ought to contribute equally to the healthcare system   9
whether one falls ill or not. The benefits of the health system are then distributed according to 
need.  
Vertical equity, on the other hand, requires that the health financing system should 
discriminate according ability to pay. Households with unequal ability to pay should pay 
unequal amounts for equal needs. As Mooney (1983) notes, the principles of vertical and 
horizontal equity are fairly clear and straightforward, though problems may arise in practice. 
Figure 4 introduces the evidence of vertical and horizontal equities in healthcare financing. In 
the absence of horizontal and vertical equities, all the observations would line on the 
diagonal. However, on account of healthcare financing, some households are displaced from 
the diagonal by falling below their prepayment income equals. The post-payment ranks are 
thus different from the prepayment ranks. 
5  The incidence and intensity of catastrophic healthcare financing 
We use two indicators to estimate the extent of catastrophic healthcare financing 
inherent in the population of this study, namely: the headcount catastrophic financing 
indicator, and the intensity of catastrophic financing. While the former, like headcount 
poverty, measures the proportion of the population who financed healthcare ‘catastrophically’ 
the latter, like the severity of poverty indicator, measures the intensity of catastrophic 
healthcare financing in the population.  
5.1  Method for computing catastrophic effects 
We assume that a household has total expenditure (gross of healthcare expenditure) 
Y . The catastrophic threshold is defined as  cat Z . Where  cat Z is  x  the threshold of 
catastrophic share of expenditures on health care, Gertler and van der Gaag (1990) suggest 
that typically, the price elasticity of demand for healthcare services exceeds unity at prices 
higher than 5 percent of nonfood expenditure. This implies that at this level, financing 
healthcare would become a heavy burden for a typical household. However, many 
household surveys suggest that the average households’ contribution to per capita health 
expenditure in most economies is about 3  to 5 percent of its income (Russell, 1996). This 
study uses two catastrophic thresholds set at 5 percent and 10 percent of household gross 
expenditure. Note that this is the situation where healthcare intermediaries and large 
government subsidies are present, so that the proportion of out-of-pocket payment actually 
born by households is low. 
Following the poverty measurement literature, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2001) 
proposed the following indices of catastrophic healthcare expenditure: (a) Catastrophic 
Payment Headcount Index  cat H .  This is defined as the percentage of individuals in the   10
sample population whose healthcare expenditures as a proportion of their income exceed the 
threshold cat Z . Let Ti be the healthcare payment of the i
th household, and Y the total 
household expenditure, as previously defined.  
Let 
max(0, ) cat ii ES Z =-  (1) 
Also let  
1,
i E = if  cat i SZ >     (2) 
Where: 
i E denotes the excess in income share of expenditures of health of the i
th household. 
i S  denotes income share of expenditures on health of the i
th  household. 
Then, borrowing from the poverty measurement literature, catastrophic headcount 














Where  N= population size, and 
0 m is the proportion of the population whose healthcare 
payment exceeds the catastrophic threshold or the catastrophic payment headcount index. 
Policymakers may not just be concerned with the proportion of the population whose 
healthcare payments exceed the catastrophic threshold. They may also be concerned about 
the height (level? amount?) by which those who exceed the threshold do in fact exceed it. 
Analogous to the intensity of poverty index or poverty-gap index, the intensity of catastrophic 















1 m = the average amount by which those who exceed the catastrophic 
payment threshold actually exceed it.  
Following the same FGT example, it is also possible to propose a severity of 












However, our interest here is limited to the Head Count Catastrophic payment index 
and the intensity of such catastrophic payments. It is natural that the policymaker may not 
only be interested in the catastrophic headcount and the intensity of the catastrophic   11
payment, but s/he is likely to have an aversion for catastrophic healthcare payment; that is, 
whether the incidence of catastrophic spending is more prevalent either among the poor or 
among the rich. There is, therefore, a need to assign a weight to  i E according to the income 
rank of the household. For this purpose, it is useful to note that the weighting factor must be 
a decreasing function of the household’s total income. That is to say, households with higher 
income ranks get lower weights and vice versa for households with lower incomes. The 
speed with which the weighting factor declines as we move from the poorer households to 
the richer households is a normative issue depending mainly on the policymaker’s aversion 
to catastrophic payment among poorer households.  
Following Duclos et al (2003) we define a non-negative weighting variable  (,) wpv 
such that  
1
0
(,) 1 wpvd p= ò  (6) 
Where p = percentile of households, and v = the rank-dependent weighting variable. 
A popular single parameterization of (6) is the generalized Gini index (S-Gini) (Donalson and 
Weymark 1983, Kakwani, 1980, Duclos et al. 2003). The functional specification of (6) also 
ensures the Dalton transfer principle such that: 
(,) (,)
ii jj wpv wp v £ for ij p p ³  (7) 
Introducing a rank-dependent, non-negative parameter that ensures ethical weights 
are given to individuals according to their income level for the subgroup with  1
i E = , 
(,)
ii wpv  may be specified as (Duclos et al. 2003): 
(1 ) (,) ( 1 ) , 1
v wp v v p v
- =- >  (8) 
Where: the parameter v remains the index of pro-poor aversion to catastrophic 
healthcare payment. The larger the value of v  the faster the fall in w , thus suggesting the 
social decision maker’s greater pro-poor concern in healthcare financing.  
Noting the above discussions, and given (8), we can then capture the extent of 
inequality in catastrophic health expenditure using the rank dependent weighting scheme. 




(,)() cat Iw p v E p d p = ò  (9) 
Where  1: cat cat vI G ==    12
In this case, if those who are poor tend to pay more ‘catastrophically’ for healthcare 
than the rich, we expect the index value of (9) to be higher than (3). Note also that (9) may 
be expressed in the discrete formulation such that the weighting scheme becomes 









Note that i  (which depends on rank) represents the position of the individual in the 
distribution of n population. Note also that in (9), for12 v <<, the policymaker prefers 
inequality in catastrophic expenditures  2 v =  and implies that the policymaker is neutral as 
to whether catastrophic expenditures are concentrated among the poor or among the rich. 
This is the case of the standard Gini index. When  2 v > , there is increasing concern for 
catastrophic expenditure among the poorer members of the population .  
When these weighting factors are applied to the catastrophic headcount and 
catastrophic gap payments (when the indicator of catastrophe is defined at 5% and 10% 
levels of income) we obtain the values of  cat H  and  cat G  as shown in Table 2 and Figure 4. As 
indicated earlier, positive weights are applied in inverse order of the magnitude of income 
rank.  
Table 2: Incidence and Intensity of Catastrophic Payments 
Index Est.  Value 
(%) 
Index Est.  Value 
(%) 
Index Est.  Value 
(%) 
% 5 H cat   29.15  2 = v , 5 H cat 31.50 2 = v , 10 H cat   22.16
% 5 Gcat   5.67  3 = v , 5 H cat 33.15 3 = v , 10 H cat   22.45
% 10 H cat   21.75  5 = v , 5 H cat 34.67 5 = v , 10 H cat   22.12
% 10 Gcat   4.40  5, 2 cat Gv = 4.68 10, 2 cat Gv =   3.36
   5, 3 cat Gv = 4.43 10, 3 cat Gv =   3.06
   5, 5 cat Gv = 4.07 10, 5 cat Gv =   2.68
Figure 4: Curves of  cat H  and  cat G  (Cat.= 10%) for Different values of v 
 
Source: H.E. Ichoku, 2006   13
 
In general, we observe a high incidence of catastrophic healthcare financing in the 
population. For example, it is noticed that prior to introducing the policymaker’s aversion to 
catastrophic spending among the poor, the incidence of catastrophic headcount is about 29 
percent at the 5 percent threshold. In other words, 29 percent of households that financed 
healthcare within the period spent above 5 percent of their income for the purpose of 
healthcare. It is natural to expect that as the catastrophic threshold increases, increasingly 
less proportion of the people will be found to finance healthcare catastrophically. This is 
evident from Table 2. Please note from column 2 that more people are caught up in 
catastrophic financing when the threshold is 5 percent than when it is defined as 10 percent 
of gross expenditure. This holds for both catastrophic headcount and catastrophic gap 
indexes indices? If the social decision maker’s pro-poor aversion parameter (v) is raised to 2, 
this increases the incidence of catastrophic headcount and catastrophic gap marginally to 
31.50 percent and 4.68 percent respectively. As the value of v  increases to 5 this is 
accompanied by significant increases in the headcount reduction in the gap indexes. The 
behavior of the indexes as the threshold is raised to 10 percent is also shown. There is a 
general decline in the values of the indexes though it is important to observe that at this 
threshold, the impact of the v is less pronounced. In fact, there seems to be a gradual 
reversal of this impact as we move from the v = 2 to v=5  for the headcount index while the 
decline in the gap index continues over the range. 
The important conclusion from the above analysis is that the unweighted concern for 
catastrophic healthcare financing does not provide a complete picture of the impact of 
healthcare financing on households’ finances. The level of social concern for the impact of 
healthcare financing on the poorer segments of society is also important to note. In other 
words, one cent from the poor going into the health system is not the same as one cent from 
the rich and, therefore, an equity-oriented healthcare financing system must be sufficiently 
progressive on prepayment income. This concern arises from social empathy and concern 
when ill-health - which is a random event - takes relatively more from the poor than from the 
rich. This important result forewarns that an analysis of redistributional effects of welfare 
financing, analogous to equity considerations in taxation, must anticipate different degrees of 
ethical concerns for social, and most especially economic, inequality. In other words, the 
redistribution impacts of social programs need to happen in an environment of ethical 
flexibility.    14
6  The impoverishing effects of healthcare financing 
The fundamental economic theory behind the impoverishing effect of healthcare 
finance is the Grossman-Wagstaff model (Grossman 1972; Wagstaff 1986). The model 
shows that the cost of healthcare is the amount of other household basic consumptions that 
must be foregone in order to purchase healthcare. In other words, the shadow price of 
healthcare financing, where households are assumed to bear the full cost of their treatment, 
is the other basic needs of the household. It is therefore, hypothesized that financing 
healthcare could push households just above the poverty line into poverty, and those already 
into poverty deeper into it (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2001). To derive the poverty line, we 
use the poverty lines constructed by Aigbokhan (2000) for Nigeria, which used the food 
energy intake method to set the poverty line for the entire country and for its specific regions 
using 1997 data from the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS). For this study, this poverty line 
has been updated to take into account inflationary trends from 1997 to 2004. This gives a 
poverty line of N2900 for the southeast zone of the country.  
In order to illustrate the impoverishing effect, we estimate the variations in FGT 
indices based on pre- and post-payment incomes. We assume that the difference represents 
the level of poverty induced by healthcare payment. To also see the sensitivity of the 
impoverishing effect to household composition and economies of scale, each of the indices is 




ac ii WY n n r =+    (10) 
Where 
i W = welfare of the representative individual in the i
th household, 
i Y = gross 
household expenditure;  a n = number of adults in the household; expenditure of the 
household; and  c n = number of children. The parameter r  represents the adult equivalent of 
a child’s consumption. The parametere represents the household economy of scale. For this 
study, whenr =1 (ande=1) intra-household resource allocation is on a per capita basis and 
no economies of scale is assumed to be obtained. For r =0.5, each child below age 16 is 
assumed to consume half the equivalent of an adult; and for e=0.7 and 0.3 respectively, it is 
assumed that consumption elasticities are 0.7 and 0.3 respectively. 
7 Results 
Table 3 summarizes the findings from this estimation exercise. Note that the results 
were obtained under the three different assumptions about intra household resource 
distribution and household economies of scale as explained in the preceding section. Clearly, 
as the household scale elasticity increases, the proportion of households falling into poverty   15
decreases. This is true for all the three poverty indices. For example, for 
1 P  the percentage 
of the population falling into poverty under per capita assumption (i.e. no intra-household 
inequalities in resource distribution and no economies of scale) is about 27 percent while 
under the assumption of intra household inequalities and high level economies of scale, 
(Eqvs 1-0.5 e=0.3), the percentage of households falling into poverty is reduced to only 6 
percent. The level of poverty in a population thus partly reflects the actual incidence of 
poverty as well as the assumptions made about the economies of scale among the 
households. This is not surprising since, as the scale economy increases, one would expect 
larger households (even if they were previously poor) to rise above poverty.  
Table 3: Impoverishing Effects of Healthcare Financing 
  Pre  Post  Diff   % Diff  Std Err. 
Poverty Head-Count Index  
0 P  
 Per  Capita 
0.5725 0.6139 -0.0414 -7.23  -0.0179
  Eqvs 1-0.5 e=0.7 
0.3487 0.3955 -0.0468 
-13.42 -0.0176
  Eqvs 1-0.5 e=0.3  0.2011 0.2371
-0.036 -17.90 -0.0151
Poverty Gap Index   
1 P  
  Per  Capita  0.27107 0.29994 -0.0289 -10.65 -0.0165
  Eqvs 1-0.5 e=0.7  0.135468 0.15954
-0.02408 -17.77 -0.0129
  Eqvs 1-0.5 e=0.3  0.0637 0.08021
-0.01651 -25.92 -0.0094
Square Poverty Index 
2 P  
 Per  Capita  0.163423 0.18550
-0.02207 -13.51 -0.0139




  Eqvs 1-0.5 e=0.3 
0.02887 0.03670 -0.0078 -27.11 -0.0065
Source: H.E. Ichoku, 2006 
A further implication of increasing household scale economy is that the impact of 
healthcare financing on poverty increases. Thus, we observe that under the three indices the 
percentage of poverty induced by health care financing is greater the higher the household 
economy of scale. The table shows that under the per capita assumption, the proportion of 
people that live in poverty before healthcare payment is about 57 percent, which increases to 
61 percent at post-payment.  Again looking at Table 3, we find that healthcare financing led 
to further increases in headcount index by about 7 percent. This is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level as indicated in the last column of Table 3. For all the three indices 
(headcount, poverty gap, and severity of poverty indices), healthcare financing worsens the 
rate of poverty, irrespective of the welfare measure used. The index is worsened still if we   16
assume that there are intra-household differences in allocation of resources with children 
getting half the size of adult equivalence, and if we also assume that there are economies of 
scale in household consumption.  
Proceeding to 
1 P  and 
2 P indices it is noted again that healthcare financing contributes 
significantly to poverty in Nigeria under the three scale assumptions. It could be observed 
that even under the moderate scale elasticity of 0.7, healthcare financing worsens the 
poverty gap index by as much as 18 percent while square poverty gap index is worsened by 
as much as 14 percent even under an assumed absence of economies of scale within 
households. The obvious conclusion from these figures is that healthcare financing is an 
important source of impoverishment among the Nigerian population. Together with 
information on the incidence of catastrophic financing, it is clear that the prevailing healthcare 
market and healthcare financing arrangement need urgent policy reform as part of the 
country’s poverty reduction strategy. 
8  The AJL decomposition framework 
The central point in the Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) (AJL) decomposition 
framework is the realization that the tax function may be specified as a function of income 
level (x ) and a random term such that  
() () TT x x e =+ . (11) 
Note that tax, T , depends on the level of income x , where the error term should 
have a zero mean at each income band or level if all in the same income group are treated 
equally by the fiscal system. However, due to heterogeneity within classes of prepayment 
equals, it turns out to be a measure of the deviation of the tax liability of an individual from 
the average tax liability. If  () 0 x e ¹  then it implies the presence of horizontal inequity which 
violates the maxim that ‘equals be treated equally’. Persons with equal ability ought to pay 
and be taxed equally. In the case of healthcare financing, individuals or households with 
equal ability to pay should thus contribute equally to the healthcare system.  
Above all, it may also happen that pretax subgroups overlap at the post payment 
period due essentially to tax liability, causing some people to slip below their prepayment 
income inferiors, and some to rise above their prepayment income superiors in the ranking 
after tax. This is the key to the Aronson-Johnson-Lambert (AJL) framework for decomposing 
the Gini coefficient. The post tax incomes of households in a given prepayment income band 
are grouped around the mean given as  ()
ii x Tx -  which is indicated by a horizontal line 
from the function  () x Tx -  to the vertical axis. According to Aronson, Johnson and Lambert 
(1994), the appearance of the fans in post-payment distribution shows unequal treatment of   17
prepayment equals. The fans are induced by the fiscal system. The vertical redistributive 
effect arises from the fact that tax liability  () Tx is an increasing function of x  such that 
' 0( ) 1 Tx ££ . A marginal tax rate that is greater than unity would obviously lead to re-
ranking since it would imply that at the top of income distribution, marginal tax exceeds 
marginal income. 
Under these assumptions, Aronson et al (1994) show that total redistributive effect 
could be decomposed as  
() X-T  -G
() 1
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That is, redistributive effect (RE) is determined by vertical equity V , and classical 
horizontal equity H , and re-ranking effect R . In turn, vertical equity is composed of two 
separate effects – average tax level (g ), and Kakwani (1977) index of progressivity K .  
The first term on the right of equation (12) estimates the level of inequality reduction 
that would have been obtained had everyone within a given income bracket made an equal 
contribution to the healthcare financing system. This reflects the counter factual reduction in 
inequality under equal payment. This counterfactual reduction in income inequality is 
composed of progressivity of payment K (Kakwani, 1977) and the average tax schedule g . 
The Kakwani index is the difference between the concentration index of health care payment 
using gross expenditure as the ranking variable and the Gini index of healthcare payment.  
In the AJL framework, the weighting function assumes the implicit weight in the Gini 
index. The term 
() Fx G  is the Gini coefficient that measures inequality that arises in post 
payment distribution solely from the fact that individuals at the same pre-payment income level 
are now less equal in post payment than they were assumed to be at prepayment period. This 
is because households or individuals at the same pre-payment income level have contributed 
unequally to finance the healthcare system. The weight  x a  is the product of the population 
share of i
th prepayment income band and the post-payment income share of the band. Thus, in 
this model, global HI is the summation of 
() f x G  weighted by x a , at every level of x . The term 
() f x of  () Fx  denotes class of equals at point x  in the distribution of the prepayment income. If 
it is assumed that income equals at point x  at the prepayment income were really equal, then 
unless they make equal payments to the tax or health system, they would experience 
horizontal inequity within the ‘band’ at post-payment distribution. This within-class inequity at 
post-payment income distribution is local horizontal inequity() HI . Note that in the AJL model,   18
the choice of band width (or income class) is arbitrarily defined, and this impacts on the size of 
the estimated local HI. The HI varies directly with the size of income band width. Aggregating 
these local HI  for all the groups will give rise to the global HI .  
The re-ranking index R  is measured as the difference between the post-payment 
Gini and post-payment concentration indices. Re-ranking occurs because illness is a random 
phenomenon. Where R  takes the value of zero, then we know that no re-ranking actually 
took place in the transition from pre-payment to post-payment periods.  
8.1  AJL Decomposition results 









X G   0.4474** 0.4474** 0.4474** 0.4474**
Se 0.0111  0.0111 0.0111 0.0111
Upper C. Int  0.4691  0.4691 0.4691 0.4691
Lower C.Int  0.4258  0.4258 0.4258 0.4258
XT G
-   0.4482** 0.4482** 0.4482** 0.4482**
RE  -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008
g  0.0883 0.0883 0.0883 0.0883
T C   0.5754 0.5875 0.5875 0.5893
K  0.1280 0.1401 0.1416 0.1419
V  0.0124 0.0136 0.0137 0.0138
H  0.0086 0.0070 0.0042 0.0009
R  0.0045 0.0074 0.0103 0.0137
NB ** Estimated parameter statistically significant at 5% level  
Source: H.E. Ichoku, 2006 
 
The parameter g  is analogous to the average tax and indicates the proportion of 
households’ income that finances healthcare services. Here g  = 0.9, indicating that an 
average household in the population spends about 9 percent of its income on healthcare 
services. Again, this is a very high proportion when compared with similar estimates of 5.7 
percent and 5.9 percent taken up by out-of-pocket payment in Vietnam in 1993 and 1998, 
respectively for example (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2001). Gerdtham and Sundberg, 
(1996) using data for Sweden in 1980 and 1990 found the value of g  to be 12 percent and 
14 percent, respectively. However, the parts of these sums borne directly by the individual 
household were only 0.26% percent and 0.19 percent, respectively. Thus, the issue is not 
that the value of g  per se is very high. Indeed the value is small in relative terms, but the 
issue is that this proportion is coming through direct financing. The obvious implication is 
that, in the absence of significant and effective government intervention in healthcare 
financing, the average Nigerian household almost entirely bears the full cost of its health 
needs.   19
The estimated value of the parameter K ranges between 0.128 to 0.1419 for the 10 
percentile and 1 percentile income bands respectively. This may be considered relatively low 
considering that the value of K lies within the [-2, 1] range. The result is that the value of V 
which varies with income bands between 0.0124 and 0.0139 is only moderate under the AJL 
assumptions. This suggests that healthcare in Nigeria, under the present financing 
arrangement, does not contribute effectively to income redistribution given the proportion of 
household income it absorbs. This reinforces our earlier observation that households seem 
to purchase healthcare in proportion to their income and not necessarily in proportion to their 
need, which thus calls for a major policy response. The estimated values of H vary from 
0.0009 (for the 1 percentile band) to 0.0149 (for the 10 percentile band). The reason for this 
increase in the value of H as the size of ‘income-band width’ or the size of ‘income equals’ 
increases is simply because, given the same population, as the income bandwidth increases, 
we expect more variability within the band than if the size were to decrease. In other words 
the less the number of classes into which a given population is partitioned, the more the 
variability within each of these classes, and vice versa. This implies that under the AJL 
approach as the income bandwidth increases, the more inequality we have within the income 
class and hence, the more horizontal inequality that is registered.  
That the values of H are greater than zero imply that the financing system would have 
been more redistributive without horizontal inequity. 
If the variations within the net income of each prepayment income band are high, we 
expect H to be high. This means that, as the size definition of the income band increases the 
value of H also increases. This is reflected in the estimated results where the wider income 
bands have high estimated values of H. But as the size of the income band approaches zero 
the value of H also approaches zero (see for example the value of H at income band of 1 
percentile).  
The final component of the AJL decomposition is re-ranking R  which measures the 
extent of overlapping of flaps between income bands. Conceptually, horizontal inequity and 
re-ranking, though distinct, are very closely related, yet in practice they are inversely related 
as shown by the estimated results in Table 4. It can be seen that as the size of the pre-
payment income band broadens, H increases while R decreases and vice versa, indicating a 
trade off between H and R. As the band width approaches zero, the value of H approaches 
zero as all horizontal inequity now turn into re-ranking effect. All these point to the fact that   20
the estimates of V, H, and R are sensitive to the definition of income band. This is one of the 
weak points of the AJL decomposition framework.
3 
Conclusion 
This study has shown that when the decision to utilize healthcare is co-terminus with 
the decision to finance healthcare, the healthcare financing system is likely to lead to high 
incidence of catastrophic healthcare financing, impoverishment, re-ranking, and both vertical 
and horizontal inequities. The incidence of catastrophic financing is likely to be higher if the 
policymaker is averse to inequality in catastrophic financing. Hence policy response is likely 
to depend on the extent that the social decision maker (What do you mean by a social 
decisionmaker?) is sensitive to the welfare of the poor. The large incidence of 
impoverishment arising from direct healthcare financing also calls attention to the urgent 
need to reform health financing in Nigeria. There is a need to separate healthcare utilization 
from healthcare financing if majority of the people are to utilize healthcare services. Finally, 
the fact that healthcare financing is not redistributive in Nigeria confirms that healthcare is 
financed in proportion to households’ ability to pay, implying that households that cannot 
afford to pay are denied healthcare services.  
                                                 
3 There have been recent attempts to remedy this weakness however. See for example Lambert and 
Ramos 1997a, 1997b, Auerback and Hasset 2001, and Duclos et al. 2003,    21
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